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Recently, a human rights approach has been center-staged within fisheries governance as a response to
the limits of private property rights in reducing insecurity and vulnerability among fishers and fishing
communities. Despite its growing adoption in international legal frameworks and among civil society
organizations, the conceptual pitfalls of the human rights approach to fisheries (i.e., its neoliberal ten-
dencies and the neglect of collective rights and social duties) raised by critical scholarship remain largely
unsettled, leading to practical concerns about whether such a framework will ultimately benefit fishers
on the ground. To further contribute to the debate, this article presents a nuanced discussion of the
human rights perspective by introducing the concept of human dignity. Specifically, it argues that human
dignity, with its greater conceptual scope and depth, could act as a foundational value with which to
mitigate some of the shortcomings of the human rights approach. The purpose here is suggestive rather
than definitive and is aimed at highlighting the link that has not been clearly made between human
rights and human dignity. I argue that heightened attention to human dignity has the potential to create
wider support for the human rights approach and ultimately help facilitate its efficacy in fisheries.
& 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Human rights have increasingly been center-staged in fisheries
governance discourse in recent years [1–9]. Assisted by the latest
adoption of the Voluntary Guidelines on Securing Sustainable
Small-Scale Fisheries by the United Nation's Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO) [10], the major aim of a human rights approach
is to ensure compliance of human rights as the basis for fisheries
development and governance. More specifically, such an approach
argues that the social–political vulnerability and livelihood in-
security experienced by fishers can fundamentally hinder their
capacity and commitment to serve as motivated resource stewards
[4]. Given this position, focusing solely on fishing rights reform as
part of what are known as ‘rights-based’ strategies (sensu [11])
through privatizing access and conferring exclusive individual
quotas or collective territorial rights, is unlikely to alone produce
successful outcomes in long-term resource governance. Rather, a
broader effort to secure fishers' basic rights (e.g., rights to food,
rights to decent work and livelihoods, and rights to a healthy
environment) that condition their well-being needs to be em-
phasized too [4,5]. Therefore, the advocates of this emerging view
have reasoned that invoking human rights thinking and itsLtd. This is an open access article u
ew.m.song@mcgill.caimplementation through (some already existing) national and in-
ternational legal frameworks provide the most effective means to
address crucial vulnerability constraints in fisheries governance
[3,4,7]. In this regard, the human rights based approach is articu-
lated to be an essential mechanism with which to advance the
social, economic, and civil standing of poor and marginalized
small-scale fishers and fishworkers around the world [5].
Despite its well-intended and progressive aims, the human
rights approach to fisheries has been criticized for its conceptual
weaknesses. According to some, the shortcomings of the human
rights approach, which arguably have remained unresolved, arise
in part because of inadequate in-depth a priori discussions about
the concept of human rights as well as due to the limited empirical
understanding of how to use such an approach [6,12]. One of the
major criticisms has been that a human rights approach aids the
continued penetration of neoliberalism into fisheries [12]. This fear
is the result of the human rights discourse stemming from a
Western liberal-democratic philosophy, in which freedoms, au-
tonomy, and rights become the inviolable prerogative of every
individual within society [13,14]. In this view, making decisions
based on one's independent judgment abstracted from his or her
social roles and buttressed by regimes of private property becomes
the foundation for exercising innate rights [15]. Critics have
warned that the emphasis on private individuals and their per-
sonal claims to the basic material conditions of life could invite annder the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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based solutions in fisheries while simultaneously causing the
erosion of the cultural, historical, and social makeup of fishing
communities [12]. Consistent with this concern, human rights
based language, such as that of food security and human well-
being, now appears in the promotion of neoliberal style fisheries
management interventions [16] that include catch shares, export-
oriented industrial aquaculture, and other forms of ocean grabbing
(see [17,18]). The Global Partnership for Oceans under the auspices
of the World Bank presents another example of the neoliberal use
of human rights language (see [19]). Ironically, the use of human
rights “talk” by the proponents of private property rights turns on
its head the logic of human rights advocates who have advanced
human rights discourse precisely to highlight the limitations of
neoliberal property rights approaches.
A related concern for the human rights approach is the in-
compatibility between human rights, which are predicated on
discrete individual entitlements, and collective rights, which
confer indivisible privileges to social groups. Human rights are
private, individual, and autonomous, meaning that they are in-
herent to all people and unmediated by social relations [15]. On
the contrary, collective rights only make sense in the context of a
group and cannot be divided or made transactable by individuals.
Further incompatibility may arise because group rights could re-
sult in treating the group members unevenly, while excluding
non-members altogether. In other words, the claim for collective
rights is about reasserting the value and tradition of the commu-
nity over the individual, even if it results in an inegalitarian and
inequitable distribution of benefits to members, strictly speaking
[15]. Such a stipulation that denies universal access to and a share
of the basic economic resources would imply a blatant violation of
an individual human right. Ruddle and Davis [12] contend that
most fisheries in the world, especially small-scale fisheries, are still
embedded in social relationships, associated with particular geo-
graphical meanings and organized according to a collective right
to participate in fishing life and livelihoods. They have argued,
therefore, that promotion of a human rights approach could dis-
franchise fishing communities by overturning their socio-cultural
foundations and allowing further permeation of individualized
and commoditized fishing rights. In this regard, they have em-
phasized instead the notion of group rights akin to what is ex-
pressed in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
as the locus of rights-based advocacy in fisheries.
The third concern is that of who the ‘duty-bearers’ are in terms
of fulfilling human rights requirements. In fisheries as well as
elsewhere, human rights are conceived of as held and claimed by
individuals primarily in relation to society, and more typically to
society in the form of the state [14,15]. Representing a particular
effort to re-configure the basic form of the relationship between
the modern individual and the state [20], the human rights dis-
course encourages citizens (e.g., fishers) to hold duty-bearers to
account in safeguarding their basic rights protected by law and the
moral order, for example, with regard to rights to food, health care
and social insurance. In fisheries, these duty-bearers would typi-
cally include the state fisheries management agencies and possibly
other authorities such as lawmakers and the maritime police as
well as international donor agencies and global civil society [4,9].
Critics have, however, questioned the validity of the key assump-
tion held by many fisheries researchers that the state can be relied
upon to serve the best socio-economic interests of its citizens
[12,13]. That the state can be the major contributor to the reali-
zation of basic human rights while at the same time possibly be
the greatest violator of these rights has been the case many times,
including the recent instance of human rights infringements by
the Icelandic government through its promotion of the individual
transferable quota (ITQ) system [21] (see also [22–24] for otherexamples where the state and other levels of government have
failed to protect fishers and the basic fishing conditions). In fact,
this ambivalence of the state as credible duty-bearers has long
been recognized in general human rights literature on genocides
and famines [14,25].
In addition, scholars have also paid attention to the important
distinction between duty and entitlement within human rights
discourse [14,26]. In the general theory of rights, individuals’ du-
ties to society are an essential cornerstone of any rights-based
regime [27]. In the human rights thinking, however, because of the
fact that the fulfillment of social obligations is not a precondition
for having or exercising inherent human rights, the concomitant
social duties of the individual have been greatly underemphasized
[20,27–29]. This negligence of the human right-holder's duties to
society has been problematized by Garrett Hardin in the natural
resource context. In his “tragedy of the commons” thesis as well as
other writings that followed, he argued that reproductive choice as
a universal human right would lead to an overpopulation problem
because human rights discourse fails to stress and make allow-
ances for the individual's duty towards society while only pro-
tecting self-motivated decisions to childbirth [30,31]. Given the
high birth rates in developing countries, he reasoned that this
disjuncture would inevitably result in collective demise [32]. In
other words, he suggested that the human rights claim, which is
undeniably a demand upon fellow beings, must proceed in a
morally responsible manner and with proof of its value to the
community [31,32].
The question of duties that come with rights is also a significant
issue in fisheries. Broadly speaking, we can ask ourselves about
historical overfishing and the subsequent decline of target species
and biodiversity in the quest for development and advancement of
human well-being [33,34]. Was resource stewardship robust en-
ough in our thinking and action in relation to our fish-taking en-
deavor? More recently, there has been a call to recast a right to fish
(such as an ITQ) into a privilege to fish, with attendant responsi-
bilities and stewardship obligations levied on the fishing industry
in the form of “social contracts” or “social responsibilities” [35–37].
Moreover, the link between human rights and responsible fish-
eries is being duly recognized by some fisherfolk organizations
and community representatives [38]. Nevertheless, how some-
thing as fundamental and inviolable as human rights is to be at-
tached with, and even become conditional upon, the duties of the
right-holder is a paradox that fisheries scholars concerned with
human rights advocacy have neglected to give adequate
consideration.
As such, a human rights approach to fisheries can only be used
successfully if it is predicated on making sense of these con-
ceptually knotty issues. If rigorous discussions are not forth-
coming, the approach may invoke further resistance perhaps re-
sulting in the weakening of the concept on the ground. If un-
heeded by empirical and theoretical evidence too, a human rights
approach may even be criticized for being overly ideological. Yet,
trying to fully resolve these issues could run the risk of being
caught in a long-running and broad-disciplined moral philoso-
phical debate about the efficacy of human rights, well beyond the
purview of fisheries alone. In the spirit of offering a pragmatic, yet
conceptually-grounded, “solution” to this dilemma, this article
introduces the idea of human dignity. Although it is a relatively
well-theorized notion closely related to human rights, it has been
accorded little attention in fisheries thus far. This article does not
claim to be a comprehensive philosophical reflection of the human
dignity scholarship (and human rights for that matter). Its aim is,
rather, to provide a concise review of the human dignity concept
to the extent that it sufficiently deals with the concerns raised in
the human rights approach to fisheries. In doing so, I show that the
potential pitfalls of human rights thinking described above can be
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is made clearer.
In the remainder of this article, the concept of human dignity
and its relationship with human rights is first outlined. The sub-
sequent sections explore what human dignity may offer in terms
of addressing the potential pitfalls of the human rights approach.
Finally, the article concludes with a reflection on the usefulness of
human dignity as a guiding value for the human rights perspective
in fisheries governance.2. What is meant by human dignity?
2.1. The widespread appeal and usage of human dignity
Human dignity is a familiar concept in human rights discourse.
In fact, it is prominently featured in major international and na-
tional legal instruments and humanitarian policy documents. For
instance, Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
states that “all human beings are born free and equal in dignity
and rights” [39]. Similarly, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights include language about dignity both in their
Preambles and in the texts of several articles. Furthermore, the
major conventions on the Rights of Children, the Rights of Migrant
Workers, and the Rights of Disabled Persons have all included
references to dignity, affirming its significance in the human rights
context.
A major impetus to the use of human dignity in the interna-
tional sphere arose when it was used as the central organizing
principle of the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights in
1993 [40]. The ensuing Vienna Declaration and Programme of
Action adopted dignity in their provisions dealing with various
areas of human rights, such as the right to development, the
treatment of indigenous peoples, women's rights, and the aboli-
tion of extreme poverty and social exclusion. In fisheries, in ad-
dition to the FAO Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Gov-
ernance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests, human dignity is
most recently cited in the FAO Voluntary Guidelines on Securing
Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries, as the term appears alongside
human rights in three places in the text (see [10]).
Human dignity is also explicitly codified in the domestic con-
stitutions of many countries including Mexico, Germany, Italy,
Cuba, Japan and South Africa [25,40]. Most notably, the 1949
German Constitution (i.e., the Basic Law) declares in its very first
sentence in Article 1 that: “the dignity of man is inviolable. To
respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority” [41].
Likewise, the South African Constitution has referred to human
dignity as one of the founding principles of the Republic [29].
2.2. The meaning of human dignity vis-à-vis human rights
Given the frequent and pivotal mention of human dignity in-
ternationally and nationally, it becomes crucial to understand its
meaning in relation to the human rights perspective. Many scho-
lars have theorized that human dignity can be viewed not only as
an independent moral-philosophical standard, but also as the
source of human rights, that is, the supreme value upon which a
list of rights derives [14,25,40,42–45]. In other words, human
dignity forms an a priori justification for the existence of human
rights, and in turn human rights becomes a means to realizing
human dignity [46]. Support for such reasoning is evidenced in
major international declarations such as the 1975 Helsinki Accords
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. For
instance, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights states in the Preamble that “these rights derivefrom the inherent dignity of the human person” [47]. Similarly, the
Basic Law in Germany proclaims that respect for human dignity is
the reason why “the German people acknowledge inviolable and
inalienable human rights as the basis of every community, of
peace and of justice in the world” [41]. Interestingly, an anecdote
involving Eleanor Roosevelt, the first chairperson of the pre-
liminary UN Commission on Human Rights, reaffirms this con-
nection. When responding to a question about the use of human
dignity in the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, she was reported to have said that it was included “in order
to emphasize that every human being is worthy of respect… it was
meant to explain why human beings have rights to begin with”
(quoted in [40], p. 677).
Human dignity can be further distinguished from human rights
in terms of its universal scope across cultures. While human rights
standards are somewhat contentiously regarded as “an artifact of
modern Western civilization” lacking cultural basis in non-Wes-
tern places ([14], p. 303) (also see Amartya Sen's rebuttal [48]), it is
generally understood that the notion of human dignity has de-
veloped in all societies [15]. Donnelly ([14], p. 303) explains:
It is regularly argued that human rights are not a Western
discovery and that non-Western societies have long empha-
sized the protection of human rights. Such claims, however, are
based on a confusion of human rights and human dignity. A
concern for human dignity is central to non-Western cultural
traditions, whereas human rights, in the sense in which Wes-
terners understand that term, namely, rights (entitlements)
held simply by virtue of being a human being are quite foreign
to, for example, Islamic, African, Chinese, and Indian ap-
proaches to human dignity. Human rights are but one way that
has been devised to realize and to protect human dignity.
Donnelly [14] continues by saying that, for instance, although
Islamic traditions reflect a strong concern for human dignity, it is
neither equivalent to a concern for nor a recognition of human
rights. In other words, there exist many societies and institutions
that strive to achieve human dignity but in a manner entirely in-
dependent of human rights [14,15,49]. In this view, human rights
are simply one particular expression of human dignity.
Human dignity has thus enabled different societies, East and
West, capitalist and non-capitalist, religious and anti-religious to
converge on a "common language” ([40], p. 710). At the same time,
the understanding of dignity is context-specific varying from jur-
isdiction to jurisdiction, as what constitutes human dignity (i.e.,
“what it means to be human and have a dignified life with fellow
human beings”) could only develop through interactions within
and across cultures [14,25,40]. Howard ([15], p. 83) has therefore
defined human dignity “as the particular cultural understandings
of the inner moral worth of the human person and his or her
proper political relations with society”, recognizing multiple and
culturally specific interpretations.
2.3. Two conceptual traditions of human dignity
The general human dignity literature distinguishes between
two leading conceptions of human dignity: a ‘meritocratic’ (or
‘aristocratic’) and a ‘democratic’ one (see [45,50]). The former,
which originates from the ancient Roman virtue, dignitas, is con-
tingent upon merits, honors and status. It is a term of distinction. It
not only differs from individual to individual, but it can also be
acquired or lost depending on one's conduct in society. In this
sense, dignity and respect are accorded to someone because he or
she has a particular rank in accordance with his or her accepted
social role [25,40,50]. Alternatively, it may also be lost as a result of
neglect or due to committing vices. Consistent with this view,
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when they performed an instrumental function: “every human
being… only has dignity in so far as he is a tool of the genius,
consciously or unconsciously;… the absolute man possesses nei-
ther dignity, nor rights, nor duties; only as a wholly determined
being serving unconscious purposes can man excuse his existence”
(quoted in [40], p. 661).
On the contrary, the democratic conception of dignity is ega-
litarian and absolute. It is guaranteed in all persons in equal share
simply by virtue of being human and thus cannot be damaged or
disowned, in principle. Such a view of dignity is understood to
have originated from the classical writing of Cicero [40]. Because
humans are endowed with capacity for reflection and reason and
are not simply geared to chasing bodily satisfactions, Cicero said
that Man embodies a certain worth that no other living beings
possess [25]. This view of dignity as inherent and special to all
humans was later reinforced by the Judeo-Christian belief that
Man is made in the image of God, thus further distinguishing Man
from other creatures [40,45]. In the Enlightenment era, through
the thinking of philosophers such as Immanuel Kant, the idea of
human dignity came to mean that individuals should be treated as
ends and not simply as means to an end. In other words, humans
have dignity to the extent that they are recognized as autonomous
individuals having the capacity to make their own choices and
determine their own destinies [25]. Subsequently, not being able
to do so would mean incurring indignity and shame.3. Can human dignity help mitigate the concerns identified
with the human rights approach?
3.1. Human dignity and neoliberal influences
The ‘democratic’ tradition of human dignity has laid a basis for
the notion of human rights as popularly conceived of in the pre-
sent day, including those inscribed in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights [20,40]. When personal freedom and autonomy
provides the foundation for human rights, and consequently help
realize human dignity, the state is tasked to reduce interference in
matters of personal morality [20]. Further, when every person is to
be equally and discretely assured of human rights, such as rights to
food, healthcare, and social insurance, the state can again focus
intervention at the individual level or at the group of individuals. A
society's basic well-being thus becomes a matter of achieving an
aggregate of individual human rights. Howard and Donnelly [20]
argue that the maintenance and legitimization of human rights
requires a liberal regime. In particular, they contend that in the
provision of social-economic rights, “the traditional liberal at-
tachment to the market is not accidental: quite aside from its
economic efficiency, the market places minimal restraints on
economic liberty, and thus maximizes personal autonomy” ([20],
p. 805).
Probing further, several critical scholars have argued that ad-
herence to human rights creates a tendency for the state to side
with a neoliberal agenda. Governance through human rights is
aimed at enabling the basic freedoms of individuals in a way that
fosters their own aspirations. This is not incompatible with neo-
liberalism's push towards entrepreneurial freedoms, more speci-
fically the reinterpretation of freedom as less political intervention
and more private self-government. Odysseos ([51], p. 767) explains
that the state's governing of citizens' socio-economic welfare
through codification and enforcement of rights not only empowers
citizens as rights-holders, but also allows for cost-effective gov-
ernance through a market logic. In ‘governmentality’ terms, a
strong human rights discourse produces subjectivities among
rights claimants, who are made amenable to self-government andact as a partner to the state’s neoliberal strategies [51]. Conse-
quently, the human rights paradigm may be taken as a counter-
weight by neoliberal advocates to help undo the common allega-
tions that the ideology of market liberalization is exacerbating the
marginalization of the vulnerable and disadvantaged in the world
[51]. In other words, people could claim that neoliberal strategies
are actually helping to reduce extreme poverty and injustice by
aligning with and strengthening people's human rights – a con-
cern pointed out by Ruddle and Davis [12] in the context of
fisheries.
Relying on wider conceptual traditions, the notion of human
dignity opens up a different possibility of advancing human well-
being without being attached to the vagaries of neoliberal tactics.
Human dignity rooted in ‘meritocratic/aristocratic’ respect and
honor does not openly support the call for individual-based free
and equal human beings but instead speaks to communitarian
societies where community membership and traditions are high-
lighted and the autonomy of individuals discouraged. This does
not necessarily mean that in such settings humiliation and de-
privation are widespread and acute, at least in theory. Citizens gain
dignity and respect because they are part of a community
(sometimes embodied in the state) performing prescribed social
roles [20]. With greater consideration for others, reciprocal social
and economic protections are enabled, ensuring people a basic
share of social resources and opportunities [20]. Hence, a socially
responsible and culturally respectful kind of human dignity can be
achieved by most people as they earn a “secure and dignified place
in society” ([20], p. 809) – a route to dignity that diverges from the
human rights approach and is less influenced by neoliberal
tendencies.
3.2. Human dignity and collective dignity
Human rights' emphasis on individualism, entitlement and the
discretionary control of the right-holder raises questions as to the
feasibility of so-called group or collective rights. We see that many
indigenous groups are now making collective rights claims. The
distinction between individual and collective rights is an im-
portant one. Howard ([15], p. 83, original italics), for instance,
explains that when indigenous groups make collective rights
claims “they are not primarily interested in the human rights of
the individual members of their collectivities. Rather, they are
interested in the recognition of their collective dignity, in the ac-
knowledgment of the value of their collective way of life…” Col-
lective dignity, by defending a certain communal way of life, is
often linked to a group identity forged through shared elements
such as language or culture, which form part of the private dignity
of group members [52].
It is generally understood that the idea of human rights as
conventionally conceived directly challenges (and is thus made
incompatible with) collective rights [14,15]. In many non-Western
societies, dignity still frequently embodies acceptance of group
rules and norms and is associated with social constraints [15]. The
idea that an individual can autonomously realize one's dignity by
asserting his or her human rights independent of group aspira-
tions appears to be largely in violation of many societies' cultural
beliefs about how social life ought to be organized [15]. Legesse
([53], p. 129), offering an African perspective, asserts that “if
Africans were the sole authors of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, they might have ranked the rights of communities
above those of individuals, and they might have used a cultural
idiom fundamentally different from the language in which the
ideas are now formulated.”
My point of departure is that human dignity constitutes a
useful concept which is diverse and comprehensive enough to
support both perspectives of individual and collective rights and
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them. Schachter ([42], p. 850–851) notes that “the idea of human
dignity involves a complex notion of the individual. It includes
recognition of a distinct personal identity, reflecting individual
autonomy and responsibility. It also embraces a recognition that
the individual self is a part of larger collectivities and that they,
too, must be considered in the meaning of the inherent dignity of
the person”. This duality can be further elucidated: in modern life,
individuals are increasingly at greater liberty to choose and dis-
pose group membership at their will. Yet, group identification
manifested through social networks, rituals and a sense of be-
longing are what inevitably couches them in a social context [27].
Hence, dignity allows for the assertion of self-serving demands
based on individual choice but only to the extent that those de-
mands are moored by group ties. A German Constitutional Court's
ruling ([54], p. 316, italics added) effectively captures this delicate
connection between individual and collective dignity:
The free person and his dignity are the highest values of the
constitutional order. The state in all of its forms is obliged to
respect and defend it. This is based on the conception of a man
as spiritual-moral being endowed with the freedom to de-
termine and develop himself. This freedom within the meaning
of the Basic Law is not that of an isolated and self-regarding in-
dividual but rather of a person related to and bound by the
community. In the light of this community-boundedness it
cannot be “in principle unlimited”. The individual must allow
those limits on his freedom of action that the legislature deems
necessary in the interest of the community’s social life; yet the
autonomy of the individual has to be protected.
3.3. Human dignity and duties of the state and the individual
The idea and practice of human dignity thus becomes most
meaningful through interactions within the community, the latter
being defined as “a group of citizens all of whom feel a sense of
mutual responsibility for each other’s welfare” ([27], p. 5). Being
conscious of the community in pursuit of human dignity can mean
being respectful of group rules, norms and fellow members, con-
sequently emphasizing the entitlements of society over those of
the individual [43]. Collective dignity seen as such then goes be-
yond the negative duties implied by the Kantian version of human
dignity – simply requiring that individuals act in a way that does
not violate the dignity of others. Insofar as negative duties are
concerned, the disciplining of one's freedom to ensure the same
respect for others becomes primarily a constraint on one's own
behavior, that is, each bearer of dignity constitutes a strict limit to
others' actions [25,43]. It is likely that these are also the type of
duties most closely associated with human rights standards. The
human dignity concept entrenched in the notion of community
broadens the scope of duty to also firmly engage with positive
duties, such as the provision of a minimum standard of living and
the protection of cultural values. Concerned with positive obliga-
tions to safeguard human dignity rather than mere passivity or
non-interference characterized with negative duties, individuals as
well as the state gain an added moral impetus to actively secure
the essential living conditions of their fellow citizens [40]. Jentoft
([55], p. 375) has recognized this active role of community in the
fisheries context “…as far as freedom is concerned, communities
come with a catch. To be a member of a community involves
commitments and responsibilities that may hold you back. If
needed, other members may be of assistance, but they will be
concerned about what you are doing”.
Positive duty to assist in the well-being of others can spill into
the realm of environmental protection. Rogge [56] affirms that the
realization of human dignity is “only possible where steps aretaken to protect the environments on which people depend for
their basic needs”. This obligation is in fact all the more crucial in
natural resource-based contexts such as fisheries. In addition,
there are major discussions on the active role of human dignity in
international fora. For example, the Responsibility to Protect
principle reinforces the active duty of third-party states and/or the
international community to intervene in foreign jurisdictions in
cases of extreme inhumane conditions, should those with primary
responsibility to defend and promote human dignity fail to do so
[25].
As such, human dignity brings rights and duties together and
creates a stronger relationship between a human’s basic worth
and his or her proper obligations to society [43]. The scope of
human dignity thus permits giving serious attention to social
duties embedded within a particular culture and group – some-
thing that the human rights perspective alone, largely focusing on
individual entitlements and negative duties, may come to neglect.4. Discussions
Over the course of the 20th century, human dignity played a
significant role in shaping several important social and political
developments. Human dignity acted as a key organizing value to
oppose the Nazi ideology and the Holocaust in the post-second
World War period, thus helping to foster the proliferation of a
human rights paradigm in international law, domestic constitu-
tions and political and legal theories [40]. Furthermore, it served
as a central concept in the civil rights movement in the United
States (e.g., see [57]). More recently, it is being prominently fea-
tured in discussions on the ethics of biomedical research (e.g., see
[58,59]).
What function can human dignity serve in a fisheries setting?
Based on the arguments presented in this article, I argue that
human dignity is a concept more culturally sensitive, conceptually
inclusive, and mutually responsible than human rights, and
therefore can offer a robust perspective in guiding fisheries
governance.
Taking Andrew Clapham's ([60], p. 545–546) categorization as a
useful starting point, human dignity can find applied meanings in
at least four aspects in the fisheries context. It can be used to
(1) prohibit discrimination, humiliation, or degradation of small-
scale fishers and fishworkers by both state and non-state actors as
well as by other fishers in competing sectors; (2) create the ne-
cessary conditions for each fisher to have their essential socio-
economic and livelihood needs satisfied; (3) assure fishers of the
possibility for independent thought and action (i.e., individual
choice) and the conditions for self-realization; and (4) recognize
that the protection of fishers' group identity and culture are es-
sential for the protection of their personal dignity. While the first
and second points are already well-emphasized and established in
human rights thinking (see [4,5]), it is the third point and its po-
litical–economic implications, as the critics argue, that have been
crucially under-discussed and under-exposed in the current de-
bates about human rights in fisheries (see [12,13]). Furthermore, a
profound addition of human dignity lies in the fourth point which
aims to embrace social justice and collective dignity of fishers that
arise from sustaining respect for particular fishing cultures and
idiosyncratic community norms.
Human dignity, unlike human rights, is thus imbued with a
capacity to afford both “the politics of equal dignity” (i.e., “uni-
versally the same, an identical basket of rights and immunities”)
and “the politics of difference” (i.e., “the unique identity of an
individual or group, their distinctness from everyone else”), bor-
rowing Charles Taylor’s ([61], p. 38) stipulation. In other words,
dignity of fishers is derived not only from bestowing upon them
A.M. Song / Marine Policy 61 (2015) 164–170 169equal rights and treatment vis-à-vis other segments of society, but
also recognizing their distinctiveness and unique identity. It fol-
lows that human rights and group differences can be best articu-
lated jointly through the notion of dignity.
The mobilization of human dignity in fisheries does not require
reinventing the wheel. As mentioned earlier, human dignity is
already featured conspicuously in many relevant international
human rights documents and domestic constitutions, including
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Voluntary Guide-
lines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries
and Forests, and the Voluntary Guidelines on Securing Sustainable
Small-Scale Fisheries. Hence, in many cases, human dignity has
already been given a legal and political base from which it can be
operationalized so as to influence fisheries policy. In addition, the
work of many important civil society organizations and inter-
governmental agencies, such as the International Collective in
Support of Fishworkers (ICSF), the World Forum of Fisher Peoples
(WFFP) and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), who
have been supportive of human rights approaches, complements a
human dignity approach, as they have been partnering directly
with fishers and government delegates at various scales. What is
required, however, is to elevate the purview of human rights
principles to reflect the higher organizing value of human dignity.
Such a reflective (and normative) exercise is in line with a growing
plea in fishery governance literature to be more deliberative and
explicit about ‘meta-level’ governance elements, such as values
and norms, that underlie all applied efforts (see [62,63]). Thinking
in terms of human dignity, therefore, represents a subtle but sig-
nificant shift in how we approach human rights thinking in
fisheries.
A higher level ideal of human dignity implied in this paper,
however, does not suggest that human dignity is a utopian con-
cept. For instance, adhering to the aristocratic meaning of dignity
in the absence of a committed spirit of fairness and social pro-
tection could engender corruption, nepotism, or other forms of
elite capture by those of a superior rank, potentially exacerbating
injustice and jeopardizing the dignity of less privileged members.
The customary norms and practices of fishing communities, too,
have at times displayed these elements of injustice (e.g., see
[64,65]). In addition, westernization, modernization, and devel-
opment have increasingly severed fishers from the small, sup-
portive community in which they were once embedded, leaving
them vulnerable and isolated without the support and safety net
of “traditional” societies. Against the social, economic, and political
forces of modern market economies and bureaucratic states that
far too often appear to be insensitive and aggressive, human rights
may have become a logical and necessary means of assuring the
dignity of citizens, including fishers, across the globe [14]. To that
effect, many states now increasingly view human rights as a
contemporary political manifestation of social justice and an ex-
pression of ethical aspirations [66].
In sum, the human rights perspective, distinguishing itself from
the narrowly defined property rights paradigm, is becoming a key
organizing force in fisheries governance. At the same time, the
human rights approach has been left open to misinterpretation
and criticism due to its historical emphasis on individual entitle-
ments as opposed to collective rights and duties as well as due to
the relative lack of debate so far. Here, I have suggested that hu-
man dignity presents a reconciling concept that can strengthen
the position of the human rights approach with respect to fulfilling
its aim of reducing vulnerability and insecurity of fishing people.
Hence, the human rights perspective and its implementation in
fisheries is expected to stand on stronger ground with human
dignity as its fundamental guiding value – that is, human rights
should ultimately be about promoting the individual and collective
dignity of fishers and fishing communities.Acknowledgment
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